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theoretical weaknesses. Schmidt structureshis argumentby critically summarizing pluralist and assimilationist accounts, leading him to disperse key theoreticaldiscussions.Forexample,the relationshipbetweenindividualand collective
identity is discussed partially in the second, third, sixth, and seventh chapters,
hindering a clear analysis. This approach excessively lengthens the critical
analyses of pluralistic and assimilationist positions, leaving little room to explain the implications of pluralistic integration. Nevertheless, I recommend
this work for its comprehensive examination of American language policy
debates, its interestingalbeit uncriticalreformulationand reapplicationof Kymlicka's theory, and its suggestions for furtheringjustice among socially stratified ethno-linguistic groups.
Michael RabinderJames, Bucknell University
Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve: The Politics of American
MonetaryPolicy-Making.By Irwin L. Morris. (Ann Arbor:The University
of Michigan Press, 2000. Pp. 141. $39.50.)
Political science is now at a crucial point in its intellectual development.
Which theoretical frameworksshould guide scholars' investigations and which
methodologies should be employed in empirical tests of those frameworksare
questions that generate vehement discussions. Congress, the President, and the
Federal Reserve. The Politics of American Monetary Policy-Making offers a
thoughtful response to these concerns. This work argues persuasively for the
applicationof formal modeling, based on rationalchoice theory, to policy studies. Specifically, it demonstratesthe usefulness of a multi-institutionalformal
model in deciphering monetary policy-making in the United States.
The centerpiece of this book is its multi-institutionalmodel, which the author states "provides a theoretical frameworkfor understandingthe interrelationship among the policy preferencesof elected officials, the policy preferences
of the Fed, and the institutional relationship between the Fed and its political
environment.... The model also provides a useful guide to the empirical analysis of political pressures on monetary policy" (37). Two assumptions underlie
the model. First, it presumes that the Fed is the proactive institution; it sets
monetary policy, albeit with an awarenessof the sanctions that the president or
Congress may impose. Second, it presumes that the president exercises influence principally by blocking congressional sanctions. (Considerationis given
to the president'snomination powers, particularlyin regardto the Federal Reserve Board chair, but the author concludes that this power is limited.) The
model delineates the connections between, on the one hand, different configurations of presidential and congressional preferences and, on the other hand,
monetary policies that are more or less protective of price stability.The model
also takes account of the ways in which preferences may change within the
Congress, the-presidency, or the Fed, explaining why those changes may (or
may not) alter policy outcomes.
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To test the model, the authormakes use of both qualitative and quantitative
research methods. Qualitativemethods are representedby brief case studies of
presidentialadministrationsfrom FordthroughReagan. These are general overviews of the relationships among the president, the Congress, and the Federal
Reserve Board chairs,and they providegeneralizedsupportfor the model. Quantitative methods are representedby reaction functions and an extended multiple
regression analysis. This work specifically demonstratesthat the Federal Reserve Board negotiates its Federal Funds rate in order to maximize its own
preferencesfor price stability while anticipatingCongressionalsanctions. Other
influences on monetary policy making electoral cycles, presidentialpartisanship, Congressional committee preferences do not equal in level of significance the variable ("PIVOT")measuring the point at which Congress would
impose sanctions.
The author'sinterest is in proposing a theory of bureaucraticpolicy-making
that avoids the drawbacksassociated with institutional, pluralist, or principalagent analyses; as much is evident from the carefully deliberatepresentationof
the model over several chapters and an appendix. The empirical work seems
more of an afterthought,presented in order to prove the efficacy of the model
ratherthan to give furtherexplication to its workings. The definition and calculation of the variables in the regression analysis, for example, are passed
over quickly. This is most especially evident in regard to the author'scalculation of the "PIVOT"variable. Similarly,there is comparativelylittle commentary on the regression findings. While the argumentremains as strong and as
cogent as in the modeling chapters,the brevity of the empirical chaptersleaves
their deeper implications to the reader'sinsight.
There is much here to stimulate a reader'simagination.The conclusion provides a list of researchprojects for game theory-orientedpolicy analysts. Even
more intriguingis a chapterthat assesses the meaning of the multi-institutional
model for bureaucraticautonomy or independence. Describing independence
as a "multi-dimensionalconcept," the author also demonstratesthat "limited
independence" can only be assessed in proximate terms and therefore concludes that it is of limited usefulness. Even acknowledging the difficulties associatedwith its measurement,however,bureaucraticautonomyis likely to remain
a centralconcern for executive branchand policy analysts.A futurestudy,therefore, could profitably consider the usefulness of the multi-institutionalmodel
for understandingthis facet of bureaucracy.
Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve. The Politics of American
Monetary Policy-Making is an interesting account of monetary policy-making
that educates its readersin the contributionsoffered political science by formal
modeling, rational choice, and game theory. It participates in debates about a
major policy area and about the discipline, suggesting further directions for
scholars' research and for practitioners'reflections.
MaryAnne Borrelli, Connecticut College
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